Ethical non-naturalism

Introduction

Ethical non-naturalism is a position within meta-ethics, a branch of philosophy that examines the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. It asserts that moral properties and facts are not reducible to natural properties, such as those studied by the natural sciences. This view contrasts with ethical naturalism, which holds that moral properties can be identified with or reduced to natural properties. Ethical non-naturalism is often associated with intuitionism, which suggests that moral truths are known through intuition.

Historical Background

The roots of ethical non-naturalism can be traced back to the early 20th century, notably with the work of philosopher G.E. Moore. In his seminal work, "Principia Ethica," Moore argued against the "naturalistic fallacy," the idea that one can define "good" in terms of natural properties. Moore's open question argument suggests that for any proposed naturalistic definition of "good," it remains an open question whether that definition truly captures what is good. This argument laid the groundwork for ethical non-naturalism by emphasizing the distinctiveness of moral properties.

Key Concepts and Arguments

The Open Question Argument

The open question argument is central to ethical non-naturalism. It posits that for any naturalistic definition of a moral term, such as "good," it is always meaningful to ask whether that definition truly captures the essence of the term. For instance, if one defines "good" as "pleasurable," it remains a meaningful question to ask, "Is everything pleasurable truly good?" This suggests that moral terms cannot be reduced to naturalistic terms, supporting the non-naturalist position.

Intuitionism

Intuitionism is often linked with ethical non-naturalism. It holds that moral truths are self-evident and can be known through intuition, a kind of immediate, non-inferential knowledge. Intuitionists argue that just as we can directly perceive mathematical truths, we can also perceive moral truths. This view supports the idea that moral properties are non-natural, as they are not accessible through empirical observation but through a distinct form of understanding.

The Non-Reductionist Thesis

Ethical non-naturalism is characterized by its non-reductionist thesis, which asserts that moral properties cannot be reduced to or identified with natural properties. This thesis challenges the view that moral facts can be explained by scientific or empirical means. Non-naturalists argue that moral properties are sui generis, meaning they are of their own kind and cannot be fully explained by reference to other kinds of properties.

Criticisms and Counterarguments

The Epistemological Challenge

One major criticism of ethical non-naturalism is the epistemological challenge: how can we have knowledge of non-natural moral properties? Critics argue that if moral properties are not part of the natural world, it is unclear how we can perceive or know them. Non-naturalists respond by appealing to intuitionism, suggesting that moral knowledge is akin to mathematical knowledge, which is also non-empirical.

The Metaphysical Challenge

Another criticism is the metaphysical challenge, which questions the ontological status of non-natural moral properties. Critics argue that positing non-natural properties leads to a problematic dualism between the natural and moral worlds. Non-naturalists counter that moral properties, while distinct, are not metaphysically mysterious but are instead fundamental aspects of reality.

The Supervenience Argument

The supervenience argument is a challenge to ethical non-naturalism, positing that moral properties supervene on natural properties, meaning that any change in moral properties must correspond to a change in natural properties. Critics argue that this suggests a dependence of moral properties on natural properties, undermining the non-naturalist thesis. Non-naturalists maintain that while moral properties supervene on natural properties, they are not reducible to them.

Prominent Figures and Contributions

G.E. Moore

G.E. Moore is a pivotal figure in ethical non-naturalism. His work in "Principia Ethica" laid the foundation for the non-naturalist position by challenging the reduction of moral properties to natural properties. Moore's open question argument remains a cornerstone of ethical non-naturalism.

W.D. Ross

W.D. Ross further developed ethical non-naturalism through his deontological ethics. Ross argued for the existence of prima facie duties, which are self-evident moral obligations that are not reducible to natural properties. His work emphasized the complexity and irreducibility of moral duties, supporting the non-naturalist view.

Michael Huemer

Contemporary philosopher Michael Huemer has contributed to ethical non-naturalism through his defense of moral realism and intuitionism. Huemer argues that moral knowledge is accessible through intuition and that moral properties are objective and non-natural.