Anti-realism

From Canonica AI

Overview

Anti-realism is a philosophical position that encompasses a variety of views that deny the existence of some aspect of reality. These views are typically motivated by philosophical or theoretical considerations, rather than by empirical evidence. Anti-realism is often contrasted with realism, which asserts that the objects of our knowledge claims exist independently of our ability to know them.

Historical Background

The term "anti-realism" was first used in the philosophical literature in the late 20th century, but the ideas it represents can be traced back to ancient philosophical debates. For example, the ancient Greek philosopher Plato was a realist about the existence of abstract entities called "forms," while his student Aristotle was more of an anti-realist, denying that these forms exist independently of the physical objects that instantiate them.

Types of Anti-realism

There are many different types of anti-realism, each of which denies the existence of some aspect of reality. These include:

Mathematical Anti-realism

Mathematical anti-realism is the view that mathematical entities, such as numbers and sets, do not exist independently of our mathematical theories. This view is often associated with the philosopher Rudolf Carnap, who argued that mathematical statements are not about independently existing entities, but are instead about the logical structure of our mathematical theories.

Moral Anti-realism

Moral anti-realism is the view that moral values and duties do not exist independently of our moral beliefs and practices. This view is often contrasted with moral realism, which asserts that moral values and duties exist independently of our beliefs about them.

Scientific Anti-realism

Scientific anti-realism is the view that the entities and structures described by our best scientific theories do not exist independently of those theories. This view is often associated with the philosopher Bas van Fraassen, who argued that scientific theories should be understood as tools for predicting observable phenomena, rather than as descriptions of an independently existing reality.

Arguments for Anti-realism

There are many different arguments for anti-realism, depending on the type of anti-realism in question. Some of the most common arguments include:

The Argument from Indispensability

The argument from indispensability is often used to support mathematical anti-realism. This argument asserts that we have no need to posit the existence of mathematical entities in order to explain our mathematical practices.

The Argument from Cultural Relativity

The argument from cultural relativity is often used to support moral anti-realism. This argument asserts that moral beliefs and practices vary widely from culture to culture, which suggests that they are not grounded in an independently existing moral reality.

The Argument from Underdetermination

The argument from underdetermination is often used to support scientific anti-realism. This argument asserts that our scientific theories are always underdetermined by the empirical evidence, which suggests that they do not describe an independently existing reality.

Criticisms of Anti-realism

Anti-realism has been subject to a number of criticisms, again depending on the type of anti-realism in question. Some of the most common criticisms include:

The Problem of Arbitrariness

The problem of arbitrariness is often raised against mathematical anti-realism. This problem asserts that if mathematical entities do not exist independently of our mathematical theories, then it seems arbitrary which mathematical theories we choose to accept.

The Problem of Disagreement

The problem of disagreement is often raised against moral anti-realism. This problem asserts that if moral values and duties do not exist independently of our moral beliefs and practices, then it is difficult to explain why we have moral disagreements.

The Problem of Unobservables

The problem of unobservables is often raised against scientific anti-realism. This problem asserts that if the entities and structures described by our best scientific theories do not exist independently of those theories, then it is difficult to explain the success of those theories in predicting unobservable phenomena.

See Also